COMMENTS
INSURANCE CARRIER'S DUTY TO SETTLE:
STRICT LIABILITY IN EXCESS LIABILITY CASES?
An improper refusal to settle a claim may constitute a breach
of contract which can result in liability on the part of an insurance
company in excess of its policy limits. This is known as an "excess
case." While all types of casualty and liability insurers may be
subjected to excess suits, certain basic elements common to all such
cases include: a claim against the policyholder in excess of the
policy limits; a refusal by the insurer to settle the claim prior to
trial; and a judgment against the insured which cannot be wholly
satisfied by the policy. Where the refusal by the insurer to settle is
improperly motivated or constitutes a breach of duty to the insured, courts have found that a cause of action may lie against the
insurance carrier.]
The facts which give rise to an excess case are generally uniform. Most cases follow a
pattern similar to that demonstrated in the following example: the insurance company writes a
liability policy for the insured with a face value of $10,000.00. Claimant sustains an injury, the
type of which was contemplated by the policy, as a result of the insured's negligence and
institutes suit against the insured for $20,000.00. The insurance company has an opportunity to
settle the claim for the face value of the policy (or anything less), but rejects it in favor of going to
trial. A verdict is entered in favor of the claimant for $20,000.00, of which the insurance
company pays $10,000.00 and the insured is personally liable for the remainder.
Professor Lewis has outlined eight separate theories upon which the original claimant may
proceed:
(1) byjoinder or direct action [where permitted by statute or policy]; (2) by subrogation
or substitution [which is also based on statutory provisions]; (3) by assignment [which is
the most common theory]; (4) by levy and purchase at execution sale [where the
claimant proceeds first against the insured as ajudgment creditor]; (5) by garnishment
[which is a limited approach]; (6) by suit as a third party beneficiary; (7) by appointment of a receiver through judgment debtor examination proceedings; (8) by a
creditor's bill for equitable execution.
Lewis, Insurer'sLiability To InsuredForJudgments Exceeding Policy Limits, 7 DRAKE L. REV. 23, 34
(1958). The last two theories would require than an action be filed against the insured for the
appointment of a receiver who would then proceed against the insurer in favor of the initial
claimant. Id. at 37.
I t is clear that the failure of the insurance company to settle the claim here is a sine qua non
of the subsequent personal liability of the insured. In an excess case, the plaintiff attempts to
show that the failure to settle is a breach of some duty owed the insured, with resulting damages
measured by the extent of the insured's personal liability. See, i.g., Yeomans v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
130 NJ. Super. 48,52,324 A.2d 906, 908 (App. Div. 1974). The measure of damages may extend beyond this limit if the plaintiff can show additional injury. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432,426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1967). Seealso Keeton, Liability
Insurance and Responsibilityfor Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1136, 1177-79 (1954).
The plaintiff in an excess case is either the insured, or as is frequently the case, the claimant.
The claimant, although a stranger to the relationship of the insurer and the insured, may
establish himself as a party in interest. Id. at 1176.
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The entire question of excess liability arises out of the relationship between the policyholder and his insurance company. The responsibilities and duties which are imposed by this relationship arise
not only from the four corners of the contract, but also from judicial
interpretation of that contract, 2 which becomes necessary when the
interests of the contracting parties conflict. Since the company's liability is limited by the terms of the policy and the insured's liability is
unlimited, conflicts over the issue of settlement naturally arise to
complicate the insured/insurer relationship.
Ordinarily the insurer has two express duties, the duty to
defend and the duty to pay. 3 The insurer must afford a legal
defense for the policyholder whenever it is alleged that the insured
has committed an act, the result of which has caused injuries or
damages for which the policy affords coverage. The duty to pay
subsequently arises when the insured becomes legally obligated to
such an injured claimant.
The insurer's assumption of duties under the insurance contract is usually accompanied by the exclusive right to control all
When the insured initiates the action, the general rule has developed that he need not pay
the excess judgment in order to acquire standing. See, e.g., Chitty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 38 F.R.D. 37,41 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple,
270 Ala. 119, 122, 116 So. 2d 924,925 (1959); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d
679, 690, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957). This is premised on the theory that final
judgment against the insured, rather than payment, gave rise to the cause of action against the
insurer for failure to settle. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113, 118 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1967). See generally Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 778, 783 (1967).
' See Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 4,231 N.W. 257, 258 (1930) (rights of
insured extend beyond surface of policy).
For example, while there is no duty to settle under accepted contract principles, the courts
have implied such a duty from the insurer's exclusive control of the claim. Wooten v. Central
Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 747, 750 (La. Ct. App. 1964). Similarly aising from this exclusive
control is the insurer's implied duty to deal fairly and exercise good faith in considering the
interests of the insured, and to give equal weight to the interests of the insured. Southern Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 669-70, 250 S.W.2d 785, 790 (1952) (insurer must
subordinate its interests to those of insured). See Prickett v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 282 F.2d
294, 299-300 (10th Cir. 1960); Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387,395, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 488, 492 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
A typical liability insurance policy provision is:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies ... and the company shall have the right and duty to
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury
or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or
fraudulent ....
R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw, app. G, at 658 (1971). See Chappell & Epps, Insurer'sLiability in
Excess of Policy Limits: Some Aspects of the Problem, 44 VA. L. REv. 267, 268 (1958). See also Merritt
v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 868, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 517 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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litigation against the insured. 4 This can be an onerous burden
upon the policyholder when a claim is made in excess of the policy
limits, as he has only limited rights to participate in the defense of
an action which may result in substantial personal liability. 5 In
addition, the carrier has the contractual right to settle any claim at
his discretion. 6 Under these circumstances, the crucial question is
7
whether there exists under a policy a duty to settle.
This conflict brings the carrier's duty to consider the interests
of the insurer under the close scrutiny of the courts. Such duty by
the insurance company embraces the investigation and negotiation
aspects of the claim as well as the transmission of all such relevant
or pertinent information to the policyholder . Within this conflicting relationship, the defense attorney representing both interests
becomes intimately involved with the investigation and the negotiation of any claim, and his conduct will also come within the purview of
a court considering an excess liability case. 9
At the heart of the excess case is the manner in which the
4 See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 660, 328 P.2d 198, 201
(1958); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 451, 46 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1932); Johnson v.
Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 108 Vt. 269, 277, 187 A. 788, 792 (1936). See Keeton, supra note 1,at
1137.
The defense of an action against the insured has been referred to as both a duty and a right.
This is a proper characterization since the duty to defend benefits the insured, while the right to
defend is essential to the protection of the insurer. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488,494
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally 7A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4681 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN].
In addition, the insurer is usually entitled to prompt notification of all claims and complete
cooperation from the insured throughout the litigation. For an example of an automobile
comprehensive liability policy form see R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW, app. G, at 655 (1971).
' See, e.g., Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 870, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511,519
(Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The status of the insured is little improved by the retention of separate
counsel because
separate representation usually amounts to nothing more than independent legal
advice to the assured, since control of the litigation remains in the hands of the carrier.
Id.
6 See, e.g., Long v. Union Indem. Co., 277 Mass. 428,430, 178 N.E. 737,738 (Sup. Jud. Ct.
1931); Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 247 N.Y. 451,453, 160 N.E. 911,912
(1928); Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 252, 140 N.E. 577, 579 (1923).
' The basis of any insured's complaint is that there is a duty to settle. Lewis, supra note
1, at 23. Courts have generally held there is no obligation to settle. LaRocca v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 163, 168 (W.D.Pa. 1971,affd, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1973);
Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 375,379, 118 N.W.2d 318, 321(1962). See also Chappell
& Epps, supra note 3, at 268, in which the authors note that "[niowhere in the policy ... is any
duty expressly conferred upon the insurer to settle." (Emphasis in original.)
8 Lewis, supra note 1, at 27-32. The insurer must investigate all factual and legal aspects
of the case, negotiate with protection of the insured's interests in mind, and transmit all
relevant information to the insured. Id.
9 See, e.g., Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 663, 320 P.2d 140, 148
(Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (covenants of good faith and fair dealing imposed on attorney).
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carrier arrives at the determination of whether to settle a claim or
go to trial. This decision, resting solely within the discretion of the
insurer, affects substantial interests of the insured, since in the
event of an excess verdict his liability is limited only by the value of
his personal assets.1" The apparent inequity of risk in this arrangement has forced the courts to intercede in the insured/
insurer relationship. The New Jersey judiciary has recognized
the emergence and development of those principles of equity,
fair dealing and good faith .

.

. which breathed new life-giving

honesty into the bare contractual relationship sometimes mentioned as existing between insured and insurer. 1
Through the vehicle of the excess case, the courts have fostered a
new relationship and have instilled in the insurance contract respect for that relationship.1

2

HISTORY OF THE ACTION

An historical analysis of the excess liability case demonstrates a
general shift in the courts' treatment of this issue from the law of
contracts to the law of torts, 13 which has evolved through four
separate theories.14

At the outset, t5 courts addressed the issue of excess liability in
terms of pure contract law, attempting to ascertain the duties of
10

See Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 870, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 519

(Dist. Ct. Api. 1973).
"1 Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 491, 323 A.2d 495, 504
(1974).
2 Id. See also American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. G.A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830, 832 (10th
Cir. 1949) (insurer must consider insured's interests); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal.
App. 3d 858, 868, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 518 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (where conflict exists, carrier
is bound to protect interest of the insured as well as its own).
13 The earliest excess cases were based on contract theory. See, e.g., McDonald v. Royal
Indem. Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L. 308, 310, 162 A. 620, 620 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932); Auerbach v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 252, 140 N.E. 577, 578 (1923); C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing
Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 288-89, 90 A. 653, 654 (1914). There has been a general
shift to the torttheories. See, e.g., Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299,
303, 157 A.2d 319,322 (1960). In fact, "[m]ost courts are now in agreement that the problem is
one of tort law exclusively." Lewis, supra note 1, at 24 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
" See notes 15-28 infra and accompanying text (basic contract principles); notes 29-41
infra and accompanying text (bad faith test); notes 42-63 infra and accompanying text
(negligence-due care); notes 64-84 infra and accompanying text (good faith test).
"5 The issue of excess liability was considered by the courts as early as 1899. In
Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 587, 43 A. 503, 506 (1899), the
Maine court stated that it was powerless to add to or take away from the terms of the
contract. Additionally, the court suggested that expanded liability might persuade the insured
to relax "those rules of prudence and vigilance which are indispensable for ... reasonable
protection." Id.
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the insurance company strictly from the four corners of the policy.1 6
When the issue of excess liability was one of first impression in
New Jersey, the highest court stated:
"The rights of the parties are to be determined by the
agreement into which they entered. By the provisions of the
policy the insurance company was obliged to defend at its own
cost any action against the insured, and the entire management
of the defense was expressly intrusted to it, and the insured was
forbidden to settle any claim, or to interfere in any negotiations
for the settlement, or in any legal proceeding against it. The
insurer was under no obligation to pay in advance of trial, and
the decision whether to settle or to try was committed
to it. The
17
plain words of the policy have no other meaning.'

In McDonald v. Royal Indemnity Insurance Co., 1 8 the original
claim arose from an automobile accident which could have been
settled for $2,000.19 The insurer refused the settlement offer and a
subsequent excess verdict of $7,500 was recovered by the claimant. 2 ° After the judgment was set aside, the claimant offered to
settle for $3,500, but this was also rejected. Judgment was subsequently entered against McDonald for $20,000.21 In McDonald's
suit against the insurer for damages amounting to the excess over
the policy limits, the court held that in the contract of insurance,
the insurer "did not agree to and was not obliged to settle, ' 22 thus
vindicating the insurance company for their conduct.
Other early cases established the insurer's complete discretion
in the area of settlement negotiations. 23 Applying strict contract
law, it was determined that no excess liability could be imposed on
an insurer for failure to settle because the policy limits are absolute, and the insurer had no contractual duty to settle. 2 4 This
conclusion was a product of the early reluctance of the courts to
6 See cases cited note 6 supra. See also Chappell & Epps, supra note 3, at 268; Lewis,

supra note 1, at 24.
11 McDonald v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L. 308, 310, 162 A. 620, 620 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1932) (quoting from C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286,
288-289, 90 A. 653 654 (1914)) (emphasis added).
18 109 N.J.L. 308, 162 A. 620 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932).
19 Id. at 309, 162 A. at 620.
21

Id.
Id.

22

Id. at 310, 162 A. at 620.

20

2" Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 451, 46 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1932) (insurer has

"sole right to settle"); Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 583, 43 A.
503, 505 (1899) (insured, under policy, surrenders full and absolute control over settlement
to insurer); C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 289, 90 A. 653,
654 (1914) (insurer is not obliged to pay prior to trial).
24 See Keeton, supra note 1, at 1138 & n.4.
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look beyond the insurance contract in order to determine the
rights and duties of the parties. This approach to the excess liability question has, today, generally been rejected by the majority of
jurisdictions in favor of the application of more liberal tort doctrines.25
As an alternative to the strict contract approach, under which
the insurer would be liable for failure to settle only if the duty to
settle were specifically stated in the policy, the courts turned to the
law of torts. 26 Every contract, by virtue of common law, imposes on
the parties to it an obligation to perform their respective duties
with care, skill, reasonableness and good faith.2 7 Failure by the
insurer to observe these implied convenants of good faith and fair
dealing when performing its duties has been held to give rise to a
cause of action in favor of the insured or the original claimant, in
28
the event of an excess judgment.
Historically in excess cases, courts have alternatively adopted
three basic standards to analyze the tortious breach of these implied covenants. The standards have included bad faith, negligence
29
(due care), and good faith.
25 One commentator has noted that the contract theory "has been almost universally

rejected by the courts today." Lewis, supra note 1,at 24. It has been similarly observed that
"[t]he question is one of tort law." Chappell & Epps, supra note 3, at 269. Furthermore, '"[t]he
majority opinion seems to be that the cause of action sounds in tort." Note, Excess Liability:
Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 476 (1966)
(footnote omitted).
26 This action has been characterized as a "new tort," which emanates from the insurer's
exclusive control of the claim. Cunningham, Liability in Excess of Policy Limits, 1957 INS. L.J.
483, 483. The cause of action arises out of "a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing." Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198,
201 (1958). See also Keeton, supra note 1, at 1138; Comment, Excess Liability Suits-The
Mounting Needfor Strict Liability, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292, 296-97 (1968); Annot., 131 A.L.R.
1499, 1500 (1941).
27 See Cunningham, supra note 26, at 483. A California court has stated that
[iun
every policy of insurance "there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement" .
Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 148, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
See also Hills & Pivnicka, Development and Direction of the CaliforniaBad Faith InsuranceDoctrine
or "0 Ye of Little Faith," 8 U. SAN FRANCIsCO L. REV. 29, 32 (1973).
28 See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,430, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 17 (1967); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 872, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 520
(Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,50 Cal. 2d 654; 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958). See also Lewis,supra note 1,at 25; Note,Recent Developments in theExcessJudgmentSuit,
36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 464, 464 (1970).
29 While the "reasonable man" standard of the negligence test is well recognized, the
concepts of good faith and bad faith have been hopelessly confused by both courts and
writers. In employing the test which analyzes the many facets of the insurer's conduct, the
court in Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D.N.J. 1967), stated that it was using
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The bad faith standard was the first to be widely used by the
courts in order' to assess the conduct of insurance companies in
their approach to the issue of settlement. Bad faith, as applied to
excess cases, has been defined as
the intentional disregard of the financial interests of the [insured]
in the hope of escaping the full responsibility imposed upon [the
insurer] by its policy.30
This disregard is normally motivated by the insurer's desire to
protect its own interests. Thus, in Martin v. Travelers Indemnity

Co.,"1 the Fifth Circuit applied a standard which it termed "far less
stringent" 32 than the good faith test. The court held that
an insurer cannot be found liable in excess of its policy limits for
failing to settle an action unless its refusal to
settle was so arbitrary
33

and unreasonable as to constitute fraud.

the "good faith theory." Id. at 87. Nonetheless, it concluded that the insurer acted in bad
faith. Id. at 92. This test was similarly characterized as the good faith theory in Radio Taxi
Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 303, 157 A.2d 319, 322 (1960), and as the
good faith test in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 171 (1955). However, this same multi-faceted test
was termed the "bad faith" test in National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175, 179, 200
P.2d 407, 412 (1948). See also Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 395, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 488, 492 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679,
689, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
Similar confusion arises with legal writers. See Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to
Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J. 100, 104 (1937), in which the author states that fraud is an
aspect of the bad faith rule. However, Hills and Pivnicka suggest that bad faith is really a breach
of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing. They observed that "the terms bad faith or a
breach of the obligation of good faith are used loosely and sometimes interchangeably,
especially by practitioners." Hills & Pivnicka, supra note 27, at 33, 43.
An examination of the nomenclature in this area reveals only the confusion to which
Hills and Pivnicka allude. In an effort to clarify this terminology, for the purposes of this
Comment, the bad faith rule or test requires proof of fraud or dishonesty on the part of the
insured, while the good faith rule or test requires a tortious breach of the contractual covenants
of good faith and fair dealing. This analysis is supported by Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 848, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604, 607 (1973) (bad faith is not only ground for
recovery; it may also be based on good faith); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kornbluth, 28 Colo.App.
194, 198, 471 P.2d 609, 610-11 (1970) (duty to exercise good faith, proof of bad faith, and
negligence of insurer are three tests). See also Comment, supra note 26, at 301 n.49 (nonfeasance
is characteristic of good faith while misfeasance indicates bad faith). Keeton suggests that the
courts have irreconcilably merged the language of the two tests, often "requiring only good
faith as to the decision regarding settlement but requiring also ordinary care in the investigation
leading to such decision." Keeton, supra note 1, at 1141 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
30 Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 491, 1 A.2d 817, 820 (1938). See
also Detenber v. American Universal Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 50, 53 (6th Cir. 1967) (bad faith
implies conscious wrongdoing and assumes the characteristics of fraud).
31 450 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1971).
32

Id. at 551.

33

Id.
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Similarly, in Bentley v. Farmers'Insurance Exchange,34 it was held that
excess liability must be predicated upon conduct which amounted
35
to fraud or bad faith.
As a species of fraud, the bad faith test 36 placed the onus on the
plaintiff of coming forward with evidence sufficient to show that the
insurer's refusal to settle was arbitrary and unreasonable.3 7 An
allegation of bad faith suggested more than bad judgment or
negligence; it implied conscious wrongdoing.3 8 Thus, liability for an
excess judgment could arise only where an insurer "fraudulently or
in bad faith refuse[d] to settle within the policy limits."3 9
By the very nature of the bad faith test, a plaintiff's recovery
in an excess suit was difficult and unusual. This test did not readily
admit to bringing much pressure to bear on recalcitrant insurance
companies, nor did it accurately reflect the high standards of conduct to which insurers are held today. 40 As a result, several jurisdictions have abandoned the bad faith test in favor of the more
liberal "negligence test."'
Under the negligence test, an insurer incurs excess liability
when "it fails to settle when a reasonable man with unlimited
exposure in the exercise of due care would have settled.

in light of its

expertise 43

'4 2

Thus,

the insurer, as a professional, owes to its

3' 289 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1961).
35 Id. at 60.
31 See Berk v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 597, 15 N.W.2d 834 (1944), in which
the Wisconsin court stated that "[blad faith is a species of fraud, and the evidence to sustain a
finding thereof must be clear, satisfactory, and convincing." ld. at 601, 15 N .W.2d at 836. See also
Chappell & Epps, supra note 3, at 269.
31 Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 450 F.2d 542, 551 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Appleman, supra note 29, at 106.
3' See, e.g., Detenber v. American Universal Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 50, 53 (6th Cir. 1967).
39 289 F.2d at 60.
40 See notes 122-48 infra and accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying
Texas law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kornbluth, 28 Colo. App. 194, 199, 471 P.2d 609, 611
(1970); Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484,487, 56 A.2d 57,59 (1947).
But see Wasserman v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 32 Ohio St. 2d 69, 290 N.E.2d 837 (1972), in
which it was held that bad faith was more than negligence; it required a dishonest motive or
an intent to mislead. Id. at 73, 290 N.E.2d at 840.
42 Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 303, 157 A.2d 319, 322
(1960).
13 The relationship between the insurer's expertise and its subsequent decision whether
or not to settle is discussed in McChristian v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp.
748 (W.D. Ark. 1969), where it was stated that
[a] good-faith decision is . . . simply an honest and intelligent one, giving equal
consideration to the interest of the insured, made in light of the company's expertise in the field.
Id. at 753 (footnote omitted). See also APPLEMAN, supra note 4, § 4713.
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policyholder a duty of exercising due care. 4 4 The negligence rule
permits a retrospective analysis of the insurer's conduct with re45
spect to the ultimate settlement decision.
New Hampshire, in Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty

Co.,4 6 was one of the first jurisdictions to demonstrate the applica-

tion of this approach. In Douglas, the plaintiff held a $5,000 liability policy with the defendant insurer. 4 7 Elliot, the plaintiffs servant, suffered an injury, covered by the defendant's policy and
offered a $1,500 settlement to the defendant. 48 The carrier
refused, went to trial, and lost. The court, entering judgment in
excess of the policy limits, held that the insured had a right to
expect the insurer to "act in a reasonable way" concerning settlement negotiations, 49 thereby recognizing that in an excess liability
situation,
"the assured helplessly await[s] the determination of the question whether in that instance its policy of indemnity was to be a
shield in 5 its
own hands, or a sword in the hands of its an0
tagonist.
In traditional negligence parlance, the court stated that the insurer
was therefore bound to conduct the settlement negotiations with
15
the skill of an "average man." '

The negligence theory was expanded in Dumas v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 5

2

where a negligence action was brought

for the insurer's failure to settle a claim on a policy with a $5,000
4 Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 488, 56 A.2d 57, 60 (1947),
recognized that the law imposes an obligation to exercise due care upon all those who render
a service to the public:
[W]hen one knows or has reason to anticipate that the person, property, or rights of
another are so situated as to him that they may be injured through his conduct, it
becomes his duty so to govern his action as not negligently to injure the person,
property, or rights of that other.
See also Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 377, 127 A. 708, 712
(1924).
" See Cunningham, supra note 26, at 487, in which the author has set out the following
areas as germane to the issue of the insurer's conduct:
[C]orrespondence between the insurer and its attorneys and investigators;
medico-legal aspects; discussion and conclusions as to evaluation; and consideration
of the liability issues, causal relation, proximate cause and, in fact, all facts and
circumstances leading to the decision not to accept the settlement proposed.
46 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
11 Id. at 373, 127 A. at 709.
48 Id.
41 Id. at 379, 127 A. at 712.

11 Id. at 377, 127 A. at 711 (quoting from Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 92 Me. 574, 583, 43 A. 503, 505 (1899)).
5, 81 N.H. at 379, 127 A. at 713.
52 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947).
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liability limit on each injured person.5 3 Prior to trial, the injured
party, permanently crippled and having incurred $3,000 in expenses, made three settlement offers within the policy limits, all of
which were refused by the insurance company.5 4 Although Dumas'
policy had a maximum limit of $5,000, at trial the jury returned a
$12,000 verdict for the claimant.5 5 When the excess suit was brought,
the court remarked that "[t]he standard of care is at least what a
reasonable man would exercise in the management of his own
affairs.

5 6n

In applying the negligence test, the court appeared to be

suggesting that the insurance company had an affirmative duty to
consider the interests of the insured rather than a negative duty, as
required by the bad faith test, to refrain from intentionally injuring
the policyholder's interests. Furthermore, although the negligence
standards were less precise than those under the bad faith test, they
substantially enhanced the plaintiff's position. While the failure to
execute a settlement within the policy limits was not per se negligent,5 7 the standard obviated the necessity of demonstrating the
malicious misconduct or fraud required by the bad faith.test. 58 Since
the tendency of juries is to be unsympathetic toward insurance
companies, 59 the application of the negligence test increased the
policyholder's chance for a favorable verdict.
In 1938, Professor Appleman observed that the negligence test
was apparently becoming the majority rule, supplanting the bad
51 Id. at 485-86, 56 A.2d at 58.

Id. at 489-90, 56 A.2d at 61.
s5 Id. at 485, 56 A.2d at 58.
56 Id. at 488, 56 A.2d at 60. See also Appleman, supra note 29, at 106-09.
" See Waters v. American Cas. Co., 261 Ala. 252, 258, 73 So. 2d 524, 529 (1953). The
court, noting the importance of distinguishing between negligence and bad faith, stated that
-[b]oth of those terms have a well understood meaning, and we do not see any reason why
we should stumble over their application." Id.
58 A rejection of the bad faith test is clearly set out in Robertson v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 333 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D. Ore. 1970), wherein the court stated that it was
54

not . . . necessary . . . to find that an insurance company is guilty of malicious

misconduct or fraud in order to impose upon it liability for negligence in allowing a
judgment to be suffered by an insured when the judgment could have been
prevented by ordinary due care in the management of an accident claim.
See also Appleman, supra note 29, at 106. Under the bad faith standard, the plaintiff in an
excess case has the burden of producing evidence which demonstrates either an intent on
the part of the insurance company to commit fraud or that the insurer is guilty of willful
misconduct. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
11 See Jarrett,Lawsuitsfor Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 INs. COUNSELJ. 58, 62
(1961), in which the author stated:
The real danger in all these cases is that juries are prone to be most unsympathetic
with insurance companies and sympathetic with the plaintiff-insured (or his judgment creditor assignee) who presents a pathetic and destitute position. Once the
jury has sympathized a verdict for the plaintiff, an appellate court seldom overrules
it.
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test.60

faith
However, in excess cases, the application of this test
created the same confusion that existed in other areas of the law
where the reasonable man standard is applied. 6 1
Thus, it appears that neither of these traditional tests proved
to be effective since neither established any affirmative guidelines
by which insurers could guide their conduct or courts could
evaluate it. The bad faith test merely stated what an insurer could
not do-act fraudulently or dishonestly in refusing to settle a
claim. 6 2 Similarly, the negligence test never specifically enumerated
the duties of the insurer beyond the exercising of due care and
reasonableness. 63 To correct this deficiency, the courts today have
attempted to state definitively the duties and responsibilities of an
insurer in what is known as the "good faith" test which specifically
delineates the conduct necessary to meet the insurer's duty to
properly protect the policyholder's rights. This good faith doctrine,
which has been adopted by a majority of American jurisdictions, 64
arises out of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing
65
which are inherent in all contracts.
In New Jersey, the good faith test was first adopted in Radio
Taxi Service, Inc. v. Lincoln Mutual Insurance Co.,6 6 wherein the su-

preme court stated:
[T]he obligation assumed by the insurer with respect to settlement is to exercise good faith in dealing with offers of compromise, having both its own and the insured's interests in
67
mind.

60

Appleman, supra note 29, at 104-11.

The confusion is attributable primarily to the alleged incompetence of the jury to
evaluate the negligence issue. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 39-40. See also Appleman,supra note 29,
at 109, wherein the author discusses the negligence test:
The real difficulty in this test lies in one proposition, and that, to the writer,
totally destroys it [sic] efficacy. It is unworkable in actual practice. The question is
submitted to a jury of 12 men, none of whom have any legal training whatsoever,
nor any experience of any nature with insurance claims or litigation. Under the
circumstances those men are totally incompetent to say whether or not a certain
offer of settlement was reasonable.
The author has also lamented the jury's inability to handle either the bad faith test or the
negligence test. Id. at I 11.
62 See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra (relating to bad faith).
61 See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
64 See sources cited in Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d 168, 178 (Supp. 1975).
65 See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 17 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d
198, 200 (1958). See also Cunningham, supra note 26, at 483, in which it is stated that
"[aiccompanying every contract is a common law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable
expedience and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done."
66 31 N.J. 299, 157 A.2d 319 (1960).
67 Id. at 304, 157 A.2d at 322.
61
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Subsequently a seven-part good faith test, designed to evaluate the
insurer's conduct, was enunciated in Kaudern v. Allstate Insurance
Co.6" In Kaudern, a multiple automobile accident gave rise to a
claim on Kaudern's $10,000 insurance policy which had been written by Allstate. 69 Allstate investigated the claim and determined
70
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain insurer liability.
Recognizing the weakness of the liability aspect of the case, the
claimant's attorney offered to settle the matter for $10,000, to
which neither Allstate nor the insured replied. 7' A jury returned a
verdict for $175,000 against Kaudern and a codefendant, who was
judgment proof, leaving Kaudern personally liable for the payment of $165,000.72

In reaching a decision, the court applied the seven-part test to
the insurer's conduct. Testimony conflicted as to whether there had
been contact between the Kaudern vehicle and the claimant's vehicle, but physical examination of the cars revealed that such contact
had occurred. 73 The insurer failed to make a complete and
adequate investigation of the alleged accident and determined that
"'no liability' " existed before any depositions were taken. Though
claimant's injuries were severe, the insurer failed to advise Kaudern
of his right to make a contribution to any settlement offers by the
claimant.7 4 Considering the severe injuries and the information
which was revealed through subsequent depositions, the court
suggested "that it would be difficult, at best, for a reasonable
appraisal of the liability aspects of the case to result in a conclusion
of certain 'no-liability.' ,,75 Both Allstate's claim examiners and attorney suggested that the issue of liability was far from closed; on
277 F. Supp. 83 (D.N.J. 1967). The seven factors enumerated by the court are:
strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of liability and damages; 2.) Attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute to the
settlement; 3.) Failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circumstances
involved in the accident, which would result in its inability to effectively weigh the
evidence against the insured; 4.) The insurer's rejection of advice of its own
attorney or agent; 5.) Failure of the insurer to inform the insured of the compromise offer; 6.) The amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed in
the event of a refusal to settle; and 7.) The fault of the insured in inducing the
insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as to the facts.
Id. at 88-89 (footnote omitted).
69 Id. at 84.
7" Id. at 84-85. The claimant, Julia Collins, sustained severe permanent injuries. Id. at
84.
7i Id. at 86. Mrs. Collins' medical expenses had amounted to $34,843.34. Id. at 85.
72 Id. at 86.
71 Id. at 89-92.
71 Id. at 85, 90.
75 Id. at 90.
6s

1.)
The
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the contrary, Allstate's attorney recommended that every effort be
made to settle the matter. 76 The rejection of this advice indicated
that Allstate had adopted a hardline no settlement approach to the
case. The lack of interaction of the parties suggested to the court
that there was no communication among the relevant decision-making parties which resulted in the absence of periodic reviews of the
file and "the inability of either Allstate or the [attorneys of record]
to intelligently make recommendations on the issue of liability and
settlement. '77 The court then reviewed the degree of financial risk
to which each party was exposed, noting that, since plaintiffs had
never offered to settle for less than the policy limit, the insurer risked
nothing by going to trial. It determined that "Allstate's disinterest
with settlement seem[ed] to have been motivated by a desire to
gamble on the outcome of the trial.

7 8s

The court then considered the

relationship between the attorneys of record and Allstate to determine if there had been "independent legal assistance '7 9 provided for
Kaudern in view of the potential excess judgment. It appeared that
the Marley firm, Kaudern's counsel, was merely an alter ego of0
Allstate, since all expenses of litigation were paid by the insurer .
Finally, the court stated that the course of conduct adopted by
Allstate was demonstrative of bad faith, and thereby held the insurer
liable for the entire excess judgment from the Collins case. t
Since settlement opportunities traditionally present themselves
prior to trial, the court directed its attention to two areas of preId. at 9t.
77 Id.
76

78 Id.

79 Id.
80 Id.

8I Id. at 92. Although the court concluded that Allstate acted in bad faith, the court
applied what it termed a "good faith theory." Id. at 87.
Besides the seven standards enunciated in Kaudern, legal writers have offered other
factors which could be considered. Jarrett, supra note 59, at 65, enumerated eleven additional
factors affecting good faith: (1)did the insurer reject a compromise offer after an excess verdict
had been entered; (2) does the insurer have reinsurance as protection; (3) did the insurer advise
its insured to transfer his assets to parties immune from a potential excessjudgment; (4) did the
insurer make any remark regarding the low limit of the policy as being an advantage of the case;
(5) did the insurer make a subjective evaluation of the claimant's witnesses; (6) did the insurer
favor going to trial because the insured was judgment proof; (7) did the insurer reject a
settlement because all the plaintiffs refused to join; (8) did the insurer increase its reserves after
it rejected a settlement offer; (9) did the insurer establish an arbitrary settlement figure lower
than the policy limits; (10) did the insurer have a representative at the trial to increase the
settlement offer if the trial went badly; and (11) did the insurer indicate a willingness to offer the
full amount and then fail to do so or did the agent fail to offer all that was available? For a
further discussion of factors affecting good faith and examples of such categories see Lewis,
supra note 1, at 29-31 n.20. See also CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(1)-(13) (West Supp. 1975), in
which the state legislature has codified 13 unfair claims settlement practices.
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trial practice: the preparation of the defense and the negotiation of the settlement.8 2 The good faith test clearly places the
burden of proof upon the insurer because as the likelihood of a
verdict in excess of the policy limits increases, "the boundaries of
good faith become more compressed in favor of the insured.83
Thus, the court has virtual carte blanche authority to inquire into
any facet of the insurer's conduct during settlement negotiations
which led to the insurer's decision of whether to settle or to go to
trial. The court has also established a set of objective questions
which could be submitted to the jury for final evaluation, thus
relieving that body of its duty, under the negligence test, to be
8 4
totally subjective.
THE CONFLICTING RELATIONSHIP

Excess liability cases arise out of the conflicting relationships
between the insured and the insurer, and among the insured, the
insurer's attorney and the insurer.8 5 As a business, the insurance
company wants to pay as little as possible. Under contract, the
company has a duty to defend,8 6 thus putting itself and its attorney
in the position of trying to reconcile the collateral duty to pay with
the business aim of making a profit.
The Insured/Insurer Relationship
In recent years, the nature of the insured/insurer relationship
has been the focal point of judicial treatment in excess cases.8 7
82 277 F. Supp. at 88. An analysis of the evaluative factors suggested in note 81 supra will
reveal that nearly all possible considerations arise prior to trial. See notes 8-10 supra and
accompanying text.
83 Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 71, 237 A.2d 857, 862 (1968).
84 See notes 59 & 61 supra and accompanying text. Appleman, in reference to the
negligence test, suggests that
[iunno sense of the word could any of [the jury members] be considered a judge
capable of analyzing the actions of the company to determine whether or not under
the circumstances negligence was shown.
Appleman, supra note 29, at 109.
" See Hills & Pivnicka, supra note 27, at 44. The attorney, hired by the insurer and
representing the insured, is an integral part of this conflict and his conduct may form the
basis of an insured's excess suit. See, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 150, 65
Cal. Rptr. 406,416 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652,
659, 320 P.2d 140, 145 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
8" See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
87 The evolution of the excess case itself is mirrored by the evolution of the judicial
analysis of the insured/insurer relationship. See, e.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447,451,
46 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1932) (principal/agent); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J.
474, 492, 323 A.2d 495, 505 (1974) ("inherent fiduciary obligation"); Johnson v. Hardware Mut.
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Some of the earlier cases suggested that the contractual relationship between the company and the policyholder obligated the insurer to consider his own interests and those of the insured as
equal.18 The insured "had a right to look after its own interests, but
it was bound to have due regard for the [insured's] interests, as
well."8 9 Today, the law has moved decidedly away from this approach and has become more supportive of the policyholder's
interests. Recognizing that conflicting interests are inherent in any
settlement decision, 90 courts have stated that such a conflict can only
be resolved when
the insurer treats any settlement offer as if it had full coverage
for whatever verdict might be recovered, regardless of policy
limits ....

91

This approach appears to resolve the conflicting interests between
the insurance company and the policyholder, since the insurer is
deemed to treat any settlement decision as if it had unlimited
liability. The volume of excess cases, however, demonstrates that
such disposition of this conflict is purely superficial.9 2 Inevitably,
there will be occasions where the insurer will decide not to settle,
but to go to trial, thereby risking an excess verdict. This risk,
therefore, great or small, is borne entirely by the policyholder.
Consequently, whenever the claim exceeds the policy limits, the
basic problem of the excess liability case continues to exist.
Other decisions have suggested that the insurance company
Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 490, 1 A.2d 817, 820 (1938) (mutually fiduciary). Bul see Netzley v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 75, 76, 296 N.E.2d 550, 560 (Ct. App. 1971) (insurer
has no obligation to act as fiduciary to insured).
88 See, e.g., Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 514, 515-16 (3d Cir. 1960); Comunale
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958). In Comunale, the
California supreme court stated:
The insurer, in deciding whether a claim should be compromised, must take
into account the interest of the insured and give it at least as much consideration as
it does to its own interest.
Id.
s9 Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 490, 1 A.2d 817, 820 (1938).
" See, e.g., Coppage v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 621, 623 (6th Cir. 1967);
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17
(1967).
" Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 71, 237 A.2d 857, 862 (1968). See also
Board of Educ. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 293 F. Supp. 541,544 (D.N.J. 1968),aff'd, 419 F.2d
837 (3d Cir. 1969).
92 Research has indicated that while this rule was expressed as early as 1959, the
number of excess cases has not abated. Compare Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins.
Co., 339 Mass. 184, 187, 158 N.E.2d 338, 341 (1959) with APPLEMAN, supra note 4, §§
4711-13 (Supp. 1975), and cases cited therein.
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owes to its policyholder the duties of a fiduciary. 93 Traditionally, a
fiduciary relationship has been defined as one
where, by reason of friendship, agency, business association and
experience, trust and confidence are reposed by one person in
another, who,
as a result, gains an influence and superiority over
94
the other.

Such a relationship imposes upon the party in this position the
duty to exercise scrupulous good faith and candor with respect to
those who are affected by his conduct. 9 5 However, the fiduciary
nature of the insured/insurer relationship has not been defined by
these strict traditional standards. 9 6 Thus, it is evident that the
insurer is permitted to give less than full consideration to the
interests of the insured.
Insured/Attorney/InsurerRelationship
The discordant interests in this relationship originate in the
insurance company's duty to defend. The conflict becomes acute
when there is an opportunity to settle a claim within the limits of
the policy. 9 7 Such an opportunity can place the unwary attorney in

an untenable position-torn between the interests of two competing clients.
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires of an
attorney an undivided loyalty to his clientY8 The Code recognizes
93 See, e.g., LaRocca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 163, 171 (W.D. Pa.
1971), affd, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1973); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 582,
510 P.2d 1032, 1043, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 491 (1973); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors
Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 492, 323 A.2d 495, 505 (1974).
Occasionally, the insured/insurer relationship has been described as "mutually
fiduciary." See, e.g., Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 490, 1 A.2d 817, 820
(1938). Appleman characterized the relationship as being "somewhat of a fiduciary one."
APPLEMAN, supra note 4, at 553. See also Note, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance
Contracts:Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 25 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 713 (1974) ("relationship as
almost a fiduciary one"); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. G.A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830,
832 (10th Cir. 1949) (while fiduciary relationship exists, insurer may still consider its own
interests).
" De Phillips v. Mortgage Associates, Inc., 8 Ill. App. 3d 759, 763, 291 N.E.2d 329, 332
(1972). See also 3 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838, at 176 & n.92 (perm. ed. 1965).
" Svanoe v. Jurgens, 144 Il. 507, 513, 33 N.E. 955, 957 (1893).
9' See note 137 infra and accompanying text.
17 Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 870, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511,519 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1973). See also Hills & Pivnicka,supra note 27, at 44, in which the authors suggest that when
the attorney becomes a part of this conflict, he may become involved in a legal malpractice
action.
EC 5-1 provides:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of
the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of comprising influences and
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that there may be occasions when an attorney is called upon to
represent multiple clients and the attorney must carefully assess
the situation in order to avoid "the possibility that his judgment
may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues
the employment." 9 9 The Code clearly states that all doubts should
be resolved against entering or continuing representation in such a
multiple client status.' 0 0 Whenever an attorney determines that he
can ethically represent more than one client, he must fully disclose
such representation and its possible ramifications to all parties in
interest.' t The Code further enumerates several "[t]ypically recurring situations" which involve multiple representations by an attor0 2
ney, one of which is the insured/insurer dichotomy.'
An attorney may obtain a policyholder as a client in two ways:
He may be an insurance company house counsel, or he may be an
independent counsel, retained for a specific case.1 0 3 In both situations, the attorney's fees are paid by the company, thereby raising
the serious issue of conflict of interests.
The crucial problem faced by a company-retained counsel is
the standard of conduct which is owed to both clients. It has
become established that, while the company may be paying the
fees,' 0 4 the attorney "owes to his client, the assured," the same
"undeviating and single allegiance"' 0 5 he would owe had he been
personally retained by the policyholder.' 0 6 Considering this conflict
loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of
third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 5 (footnote omitted).
99 Id. EC 5-15.
100
10'

Id.
Id. EC 5-16 provides that

before a lawyer may represent multiple clients, he should explain fully to each client
the implications of the common representation and should accept or continue
employment only if the clients consent.
(Footnote omitted.)
102 Id. EC 5-17.
103 While independent counsel may be retained on a case-by-case basis, the relationship
between the company and the attorney is normally a continuing one. Consequently, the
attorney has a vested interest, in terms of future employment, in catering to the insurer rather
than the insured. Based on this, one commentator has suggested that "independent" counsel
retained or suggested by the insurance company is therefore only a guise. See Hills & Pivnicka,
supra note 27, at 45.
104 Id. at 36. While ostensibly the insurer pays counsel fees for the defense, such are merely
another expense for which the insured has paid through his premiums. Id.
105 American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 1075,
131 N.Y.S.2d 393,401 (Sup. Ct. 1954). Such duty of the lawyer to the policyholder is considered
"paramount." Id.
106 See, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378,391-92, 119 N.W.2d 703, 712 (1963). See
note Ill infra and cases cited therein.
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situation, a California court has suggested that, generally, no
conflict will arise since the interests of the company and insured
are presumably the same.' 0 7 Should a conflict arise, however, the
dual representation need not be terminated as long as the attorney
complies with the directives of the Code of Professional Responsibility' 08 in making a full disclosure of the conflict to the insured and
obtaining his consent. 0 9 Whether such disclosure to an inexperienced insured can ever afford adequate protection of the insured's
t 0
interests is doubtful."
As has been exemplified in the excess cases, the attorney's
conflicting interests become intensified during the period of pretrial negotiation."' The insured has contracted with his insurance
company for the defense of all suits which might be brought
against him arising out of injuries or damages for which the policy
would afford coverage. 1 2 The question which then arises with
respect to settlement negotiations is: Whom does the attorney represent during those negotiations for settlement?
Attempting to answer the question, a New York court, in
107 Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858,869, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511,518 (Dist. Ct.

App. 1973).
105 See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
109 See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 146, 147, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413-14 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1968). See also Keeton, supra note 1, at 1169; Hills & Pivnicka,supra note 27, at 36-37. It
may be argued that the issue of consent does not arise since the insured has "consented" in the
insurance contract to relinquishing control over his defense. However, such "consent" does not
comply with the requirements of EC 5-16 of the Code. For text of EC 5-16 see note 101 supra.
...See notes 165-70 infra and accompanying text.
.. See notes 81-82 supra. At trial, a different, although equally problematic conflict,
may arise. Quite often, an insured may be charged with several counts, only some of which
the policy covers. Such a case arises when the plaintiff alleges both negligent and intentional
torts, the latter not covered by standard insurance policies.
If the liability issue is likely to be decided against the insured, the attorney may be
placed in a peculiar position. If the attorney is loyal to the insured, he will attempt to show
that the tort was committed negligently, at the consequent expense of the insurer. Alternatively, the attorney may favor the company and foster the idea of an intentional tort, thus
preserving the insurer's position.
New Jersey courts have taken two approaches to limit the effect of this potential conflict.
First, the courts have construed the term "intentional act" very narrowly. Not only must the
act be intended, but the specific injury must also be intended. Thus, in Hanover Ins. Group
v. Cameron, 122 N.J. Super. 51, 298 A.2d 715 (Ch. 1973), in which the defendant punched
the plaintiff's deceased husband, who subsequently struck his head on the floor and died,
the court found that the defendant had not intended to kill the decedent and hence the
wrongful death action would be covered by the policy. Id. at 61, 298 A.2d at 721. Second, in
a more procedural approach to the problem, the New Jersey supreme court has indicated
that where such an insoluble conflict arises, the insured should be permitted to retain
personal counsel and, in the event that it is subsequently determined that the claim was one
which the insurer was obligated to pay, should be reimbursed by the company for legal
expenses. See Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 390, 267 A.2d 7, 10 (1970).
112 See note 3 supra.
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American Employers Insurance Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc.,'" 3

stated:
The attorney may not seek to reduce the company's loss by
attempting to save a portion of the total indemnity in negotiations for the settlement of a negligence action, if by so doing he
of the
needlessly subjects the assured to judgment in excess
4
policy limit. His duty to the assured is paramount.'

A contrary view has been expressed by Professor Keeton who
suggests that the attorney-client relationship does not extend to the
area of settlement, and that in this aspect of the litigation, the
attorney represents only the interests of the insurance company. 1 5

Citing Professor Keeton's article, the California court of appeals, in
Lysick v. Walcom," 6 emphasized that while the attorney-client relationship existed with respect to the legal defense of the claim, "the
attorney ha[d] no duty to the insured in the matter of settlement."' 17

The insurance company has two primary concerns at settlement negotiations which must be protected by the attorney. Initially, the attorney must guard the interests of the company"' with
respect to liability and damages, and must evaluate the claims and

attempt to reach an acceptable settlement figure. Then the attorney, as agent for the insurer, must also protect the company
"against liability for failure to discharge its duties to [the] insured."" 9 It is in this latter duty that the attorney's greatest prob-

lem will arise, since "[t]he obligation of fair dealing and the duty to
act in good faith rest equally upon the insurance company and the
1 20
attorney."
205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
Id. at 1075, 131 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
"5 Keeton, supra note 1, at 1169. In fact, it has been suggested that the insurer acts

"1
114

rather as an independent contractor in effecting settlements. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v.
Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 509, 196 S.E. 279, 285 (1938).
116 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
117 Id. at 149-50, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
"I

See Keeton, supra note 1, at 1169.

119 Id.
120 Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 663, 320 P.2d 140, 148 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958). While not yet the subject of specific judicial scrutiny, the role of the defense
attorney in an excess case may be precarious. The attorney has no direct responsibility to the
insured during settlement negotiations. His duty is primarily to safeguard the interests of the
insurance company. However, in discharging this duty, the attorney must take into consideration the interests of the insured and endeavor to avoid the possibility of involving the company
in an excess suit. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 150, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 416 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1968). See note 1I5supra. The insured has no cause of action against the attorney, Keeton,
supra note 1, at 1169, but query if the company might not have an action against the attorney for
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The judicial analysis of these two relationships, the insured/
insurer and the insured/attorney/insurer, has formed the polestar
around which the excess cases have evolved. The insured/insurer
relationship is now viewed by the courts in favor of the policyholder. 121 Also, the attorney's duties and responsibilities have become oriented toward the insured rather than the insurer, thus
evidencing the true nature of the insurer's responsibilities in the
excess case.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The past decade has witnessed a general evolution and expansion of the good faith test in many jurisdictions.1 22 This development has been fostered by the realization that in an excess case, the
insured has no "effective control over the lawsuit" nor, by his
independent action, can he limit what may prove to be serious and
1 23
substantial financial losses.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Rova Farms Resort, Inc.
v. Investors Insurance Co., 124 in a four-part opinion, analyzed a
typical excess case 1 25 in traditional good faith standards. The court
indemnity based on malpractice. It has been suggested that if the attorney's recommendation
regarding settlement
is negligently made and [the] company reasonably relies upon it to its detriment in
reaching its decision, there is no apparent reason for exonerating the attorney.
Id. at 1173. In Ivy, supra at 663, 320 P.2d at 148, the conduct of the defense attorney was the
basis for the insured's action against the insurer. It would appear that this was a prima facie
breach of the attorney's duty to protect the insurer from excess liability.
121 The trend toward favoring the policyholder is gaining judicial acceptance. See note 93
supra.
122 See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168. 178 (Supp. 1975).
123 Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 870, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 519 (Dist.

Ct. App. 1973). There, the California court stated that while it is always in the interests of
the insured to settle, the interests of the insurer are governed by mathematical probabilities.
Id. at 869-70, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19. Furthermore, since the insurer has reserved the
exclusive right to settle the claim, the insured may face substantial loss which can be averted
only by the insurer's action over which the insured has no control. Id. at 870, 110 Cal. Rptr.
at 519.
124 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
2'5 The facts which gave rise to the Rova Farms excess case are a classic example of
inadequate liability evaluation and institutional decision-making. On July 25, 1965, Lawrence
McLaughlin, as a commercial invitee of Rova Farms Resort, dove into three or four feet of
water in Rova's lake. McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 298, 266 A.2d 284, 289
(1970). Striking the bottom of the lake, the plaintiff suffered severe injuries, which resulted
in his becoming "almost a total quadriplegic and the condition [was] permanent." Id. at 299,
266 A.2d at 290. In the face of these "tragic" injuries and $50,000 coverage of its insured,
Rova Farms, Investors Insurance Company offered McLaughlin $12,500 to settle his claim.
65 N.J. at 481, 323 A.2d at 499. At no time through the trial and the subsequent appeal was
this offer increased. Id.
McLaughlin presented a pathetic figure to the jury, appearing before the court strapped
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focused on two aspects of the insurer's conduct. First, the insurer
had the affirmative obligation to explore all settlement possibilities
and, if necessary, to initiate negotiations with the claimant.' 2 6 Second, the insurer could not bargain defensively, but had to take
positive steps toward settling within the policy limits. 127 When a
plaintiff demonstrated a breach of either of these duties, bad
faith was shown and a prima. facie case established. 128 At that
point, the burden shifted to the insurer to demonstrate that there
was no possibility of effecting a settlement within the policy limits
or at a higher figure to which the insured might have contributed.129 This was the holding of the court, as expressed in the first two
points of the opinion. It has been recently followed by the New Jersey
30
appellate division in the case of Yeomans v. Allstate Insurance Co. 1
The landmark feature of the Rova Farms opinion was expressed by Chief Justice Hughes in the third point.' 3' Employing
1 32
substantial language from both Merritt v. Reserve Insurance Co.
and Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 33 the supreme court observed
that an insured faced with a potential excess verdict is not in an
enviable position. 1 34 Quoting from Merritt, the court stated:
"The assured ,is
not in a position to exercise effective control
over the lawsuit or to further his own interests by independent
into a wheelchair. In light of these extensive and permanent injuries, thejury came back with a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $225,000. Id. This verdict was reversed by the appellate
division in an unreported opinion and the cause was remanded for a new trial. However, before
a new trial could be held, the supreme court granted certification, 55 N.J. 162, 259 A.2d 914
(1969), and reinstated the verdit of the trial court. McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, I nc.,supra at 313,
266 A.2d at 297. Throughout this entire period of protracted litigation, Investors' position of
non-liability never waivered.
Milton Liebowitz, Investors' attorney retained to represent Rova, had indicated to the
insurer that on retrial of the matter, a $500,000 verdict would be possible in view of the
severity of the injuries. 65 N.J. at 482, 323 A.2d at 499. Despite this advice, Investors'
remained adamant against making any further settlement offers. Id. at 489, 323 A.2d at 503.
It appeared throughout the case that settlement could have been had if $50,000, the
maximum limit of the policy, had been offered by Investors. Id. at 485, 323 A.2d at 501.
126 65 N.J. at 493, 496, 323 A.2d at 505, 507.
127 Id. at 495-96, 323 A.2d at 506-07. The court, citing State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland,
221 Tenn. 421, 427 S.W.2d 30 (1968), observed that the issue of good faith did not hinge on
the claimant's settlement offer. 65 N.J. at 495-96, 323 A.2d at 506-07.
12s 65 N.J. at 496, 323 A.2d at 507.
129 Id.
"' 130 N.J. Super. 48, 51, 324 A.2d 906, 908 (App. Div. 1974). The court in Yeomans
indicated that such a prima facie case established damages to the extent of the difference
between the policy limits and the amount of the excess verdict. Id. at 52, 324 A.2d at 908-09.
131 65 N.J. at 496-502, 323 A.2d at 507-10.
132 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
13166 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
134 65 N.J. at 497, 323 A.2d at 507.
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action, even when those interests appear in serious jeopardy.
The assured may face the possibility of substantial loss which can
be forestalled only by action of the carrier. Thus the assured may
find himself and his goods in the position of a passenger on a
on a vessel under the excluvoyage to an unknown destination
1 35
sive management of the crew."
This "exclusive management" is the source of the fiduciary aspects
of the insured/insurer relationship, 36 yet the good faith test permits the insurer to avoid those most stringent duties which are
traditionally imposed upon fiduciaries in areas other than insurance law.' 3 7 The court noted that "the good faith norm, as presently construed, permits the insurer to be less responsive to the
fiducial obligation than is any other type of fiduciary."' 38 Even
where the company approaches the settlement as if it has full
coverage, any decision against settling is necessarily against the best
interests of the policyholder,13 9 and
"the rejection of a settlement within the limits where there is any
danger of a judgment in excess of the limits can be justified, if at
"..."140
all, only on the basis of interests of the insurer .
The result is that the fiduciary insurer is permitted to weigh his
141
own personal interests against those of his principal, the insured.
This position is incongruous with all common law fiduciary princi14 2
ples.
i3-Id. (quoting from Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 870, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 511, 519 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
136 65 N.J. at 492, 323 A.2d at 505.
'31 Such traditional fiduciary duties are the duty to act solely for the interests of the
principal, and that the interests of the agent must be subservient to those of the principal unless
otherwise agreed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 39 & 393 (1958). For a discussion
regarding the fiduciary duties of corporate management personnel see H. HENN, LAW OF
CORPORATIONS §§ 235-4 1, at 457-82 (2d ed. 1970). But see Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal
App. 3d 858, 874, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 521 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973), in which the court notes that a
completely different standard has arisen with regard to insurance companies as opposed to
trustees, agents or public officers when confronted with conflicting interests. See also note 93
supra and cases cited therein, which indicate that the courts have compromised the strict duties
of a fiduciary in favor of the insurer.
13 65 N.J. at 499, 323 A.2d at 509.
139 Id. at 498, 323 A.2d at 508.
110 Id. at 501-02, 323 A.2d at 510 (quoting from Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d
425, 430-31, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967)).
141 65 N.J. at 500, 323 A.2d at 509.
142 Rova Farms reaffirms the language of the Merritt court:
"In most legal relationships determination of the merits of conflicting interests
by one of the parties to the conflict is forbidden. No man can be judge in his own
case; no trustee may weigh his personal interest against that of his beneficiary; no
agent may evaluate his personal profit against that of his principal; and no public
officer may balance private gain against public interest."
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In refusing to settle, the insurer has independently deter14 3
mined to sacrifice the interests of the insured in favor of its own.
This unilateral decision-making process prompted the supreme
court to suggest that since only the insurer can profit from the
gamble of going to trial, then only the insurer should bear the risks
of an excess verdict.1 44 This rule, which implies that an insurer will
be absolutely liable for an excess verdict whenever it refuses to
settle, had been previously advocated by various legal authorities. 14 5 Such a rule would finally resolve the inherent conflicts which
arise between the insurance company and its policyholder. The
insurer would then be free to settle or try any case without compelling
the insured to bear the burden of that decision. 1 4 6 As the California
supreme court noted in Crisci,
an insurer should not be permitted to further its own interests by
rejecting opportunities to settle within the policy limits unless it is
also willing
to absorb losses which may result from its failure to
1 47
settle.

The future direction of the New Jersey supreme court appears to
be the imposition of absolute liability on the insurer whenever a
refusal to settle is followed by an excess verdict. While this rule,
expressed in point three of the Rova Farms decision, is merely dictum,
Chief Justice Hughes indicated that it was the duty of all courts "to
prevent the law from inflicting unjust results. 1 4 s
CONCLUSIONS

Two pertinent questions are raised by point three of the opinion in Rova Farms. First, will the courts of New Jersey, in an
appropriate situation, apply the doctrine of strict or absolute liabilId. at 499-500, 323 A.2d at 509 (quoting from Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d
858, 874, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 521 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
143 65 N.J. at 498, 323 A.2d at 508. The decision to go to trial rather than to settle has
been recognized as a selfish one, designed to save insurance company money at the risk of
exposing the policyholder's money. Id. See also Note, supra note 25, at 483.
65 N.J. at 500, 323 A.2d at 509.
'4 See id. at 500-01, 323 A.2d at 510 and sources cited therein. See also Comment,
supra note 26, at 306-10. For a discussion of the effect of strict liability on the excess case see
notes 149-70 infra and accompanying text.
"1 65 N.J. at 500, 323 A.2d at 509.
147 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
148 65 N.J. at 502 & n.9, 323 A.2d at 510. See also Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d

425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967), wherein the theory of strict liability
was suggested to the court in a brief filed by amicus curae. While recognizing some merit in
the theory, the California court stated that the facts of the Crisci case did not require the
adoption of such a rule. Id. at 431-32, 426 P.2d at 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
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ity to an insurance excess case? A close reading of point three
suggests that the answer to this question is in the affirmative. The
court noted-that, in recent years, substantial protection has been
extended to the general class of consumers, of which an insurance
purchaser is one.' 49 A policyholder has purchased a specific
amount of protection and is entitled to expect that amount to be
50
exercised in his favor whenever a settlement can be effected.1
The court indicated that where the insurer decides not to settle, it
should be the insurer alone who bears the risk of a possible excess
verdict.1 5 ' Quoting Crisci, the court noted that justice demands that
"'the insurer, which may reap the benefits of its determination not
to settle, should also suffer the detriments of its decision.' "152
Furthermore, the court characterized the projected new rule as
conseone "requiring the carrier in all cases to bear the financial
'5 3
quences of its failure to offer its policy in settlement."'
In an effort to protect consumers, the doctrine of strict liability
has been uniformly applied to products liability cases in New Jersey. 15 4 Viewing the policyholder as simply another consumer, the
application of strict liability to the insurance excess case is not
beyond the scope of recent judicial trends. The language of the
supreme court is couched in terms of absolute liability.15 5 While the
rule in New Jersey today with regard to insurance excess cases is
not strict liability, it can be said that, given the appropriate factual
setting, such a rule should be applied by the court.
The second question which arises from Rova Farms is that,
assuming that strict liability will be applied in this state, what effect
will it have on the practice of insurance law? This effect can be
most easily analyzed in terms of the three parties associated with
any insurance litigation: the policyholder, the insurance company,
and the defense attorney.
The Policyholder
Clearly, the policyholder stands to gain the most from the
application of the strict liability doctrine. The Supreme Court of
149 65 N.J. at 497, 323 A.2d at 507.
at 500, 323 A.2d at 509.

150 Id.
151 Id.

152 Id. at 502,323 A.2d at 510 (quoting from Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 43 1,

426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967)).
153 Id. at 500 n.7, 323 A.2d at 509 (emphasis added).
154 See, e.g., Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 590, 326 A.2d 673, 677 (1974),
and cases cited therein.
155 65 N.J. at 501-02, 323 A.2d at 510.
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New Jersey commented that "[i]t is always to the benefit of the
insured to settle and thereby avoid the danger of an excess verdict." 156 Such logic was similarly stated by the California court in
1 57
the Crisci case.
In addition, the policyholder would no longer be the victim of
those "institutional considerations" which reflect themselves in the
insurer's settlement decision, but which have no relation to the
claim itself. It has been observed that
insurance companies . . . adopt "no settlement" or "selective

settlement" programs to numb the public's claim-consciousness,
to fight organized fraudulent claims,
or to create a tight-fisted
5
image for plaintiffs' attorneys.1

A strict liability rule would protect a policyholder from these "institutional considerations" that unjustly affect the final settlement
decision.
The Insurance Company

Superficially, it would appear that the insurance company
might be irreparably harmed by the application of the strict liability
doctrine. It has been suggested that such a rule would promote
low-limit policies, with the hope on the part of the insured that the
company would bear the risk of the excess verdict.1 5 9 An insured
with limited assets is going to purchase a low-limit policy (if, in fact,
he has any insurance at all) regardless of the state of the law with
regard to excess cases. Similarly, an insured with substantial assets
to risk in the case of an excess verdict would not, in all good sense,
purchase a low-limit policy on the slim chance that any excess
verdict would be absorbed by the insurer. The degree of risk of
personal assets in such a situation could never be compensated by
the difference in premium payments. It has also been contended
that plaintiffs in suits with only "nuisance" value would gain additional bargaining strength under a strict liability rule.16 0 The court
in Rova Farms answers this contention directly:
[U]nder the doctrine presently in force the company, supposedly, is already making settlement decisions as though it would be
156 Id. at 498, 323 A.2d at 508.
157 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. The court stated:

Obviously, it will always be in the insured's interest to settle within the policy limits
when there is any danger, however slight, of a judgment in excess of those limits.
Id.

158 See Note, supra note 25, at 482.
159 Id. at 484.
161

See Comment, supra note 26, at 309. See also 65 N.J. at 500 n.7, 323 A.2d at 509.
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liable for the entire sum of any adverse verdict. Therefore, a
carrier should be no more willing to settle under such a
broadened rule than it is at present, and should in such an event
prove no easier prey to unreasonable plaintiff demands than
now. Were a carrier to settle more often or at higher figures than
it presently does, this fact would only suggest that the company
16 1
has been ignoring the standards set forth by this Court.
Regardless of these illusory problems, there are distinct advantages
from which the insurer would benefit under a rule of strict liability.
Essentially, the insurer would be permitted to indulge its own
personal interests to the fullest extent desired. 1 62 An insurer could
properly base its refusal to settle on those "institutional considerations" or on any other factors it deemed relevant. It could freely
conduct extensive litigation if it were seeking to establish favorable,
low-verdict precedents. 1 63 Finally, a rule of strict liability would
substantially clarify the law in the area of excess liability and would
place the insurer on notice as to what conduct is expected when a
claim in excess of the policy limits is made. 164 Such a rule would
allow the insurer to govern itself accordingly, and actually, with
proper management, the insurer could eliminate excess liability
entirely.
The Defense Attorney
Serious questions of propriety must exist when an attorney
represents both the insured and the insurer1 65 when a claim is made
against the insured in excess of the policy limits. While the Code of
Professional Responsibility suggests that an attorney may, with
adequate disclosure, represent both the insured and the insurer,
one is forced to wonder if a policyholder, unfamiliar with legal
practice and procedure, can comprehend the problems which can
arise from this tripartite relationship and the irreversible damage
which can be caused if the attorney is forced to withdraw there66
from.
Justice Pashman, in In re Lanza, 167 addressed the issue of dual
161
162

65 N.J. at 500-01 n.7, 323 A.2d at 509-10.
Id. at 500, 323 A.2d at 509.

' By establishing low-verdict precedents, the insurance company would be seeking to
create a new "bargaining tool" in settlement negotiations. Id. at 499, 323 A.2d at 508-09.
164 See Comment, supra note 26, at 308.
165 See notes 97-121 supra and accompanying text
166 Such disclosure to the clients has been characterized as "illusory." In re Lanza, 65
N.J. 347, 357, 322 A.2d 445, 451 (1974) (Pashman, J., concurring).
167 65 N.J. 347, 322 A.2d 445 (1974) (Pashman, J., concurring).
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representation in the context of an attorney representing both the
seller and the buyer of real estate. He noted that
[a]t the very foundation of our adversary system reposes the
basic tenet that one attorney may not represent two clients having conflicting
interests at the same legal or judicial proceed168
ing.

In the home-buying situation, Justice Pashman considered that even
the potential for conflict was so great that perhaps there should be
a rule prohibiting such dual representation. 169 Justice Pashman's
analysis of the attorney in conflict is no less applicable to the
insured/insurer relationship. In the excess situation, conflict is
not merely potential, but actual and inevitable. The interests of the
parties are not the same and conflicts necessarily arise.1 70 Therefore,
it becomes impossible for the attorney to maintain his undivided
allegiance to both the insured and the insurer. Furthermore, if the
attorney is eventually required to withdraw from the matter, both
parties may suffer irreparable injury while being forced to retain
new counsel. In any case, the policyholder has been denied his
right to adequate and effective counsel.
Under a rule of strict liability, however, the conflicts are effectively resolved since the interests of the insured would no longer be
affected by the insurer's final decision regarding settlement.
Hence, the attorney is not plagued by a burden of representing
two clients with conflicting interests.
The application of the strict liability rule to insurance excess
cases would have the same sobering effect on insurance carriers as
the application of the rule in products liability cases has on manufacturers. By holding an insurer strictly liable for excess judgments, no longer would "institutional decisionmaking" play havoc
with the rights of the insured. Nor, if the obligation to either settle or
to pay the excess were absolute, would conflicting interests arise to
affect the attorney's duty of undivided loyalty. And finally, the
policyholder would be afforded the coverage for which he had paid.
From a practitioner's point of view, the application of the strict
liability rule would clarify the insured/insurer relationship and
establish the insurer's absolute duty to settle or assume the responsibility of paying in full any judgment which may arise from a
claim. The merits of strict liability are undeniable and the need for
Id. at 353, 322 A.2d at 449 (Pashman, J., concurring).
Id. at 357, 322 A.2d at 451.
170 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See notes 85-121 supra and
'6
169

accompanying text.
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such a rule is compelling. The New Jersey supreme court has taken
the first positive step toward the adoption of such a rule. This will
finally afford insurance policyholders their full and deserved measure of protection. 71 What is necessary is a direct and straightforward
approach by the courts to the issue of strict liability. Pursuing the
analogy of the excess case to products liability, Dean Prosser's words
are most apropos:
If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in
tort, declared outright, without an illusory contract mask. Such
strict liability is familiar enough in the law of animals, abnormally
dangerous activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, and respondeat superior. There is nothing so shocking about it today
that it cannot be accepted and stand on its own feet in this new
and additional field, provided always that public sentiment, public demand, and "public 1 policy"
have reached the point where
72
the change is called for.

David Novack
1
The New Jersey legislature has recently recognized the importance of such protection
by amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29B-4 (1963) to enumerate specific acts which constitute
unfair claim settlement practices when performed "with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice." Law of May 22, 1975, ch. 100, [1975] N.J. SEss L. SERV. 178, 180.
172 Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1134 (1960).

